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RAILWAY DISCRIMINATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL
COMBINATIONS.
In testifying before the Industrial Commission upon the
subject of transportation, I made some observations upon the
effect of rate discriminations in the building up and perpet-
uating of trusts and monopolies. It has been intimated
that if what was there said could be put into some coherent
form, it might not be without interest as a trifling contribu-
tion to a most interesting social problem.
Few people have any adequate conception of the impor-
tance, in a commercial way, of slight changes in the freight
rate. Not long ago the railroads centering at Chicago im-
posed a terminal charge of two dollars per car upon every
carload of livestock delivered at the stock yards in that
city. The matter having been brought before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, this charge was declared to be
unlawful and the carriers were ordered to desist from impos-
ing it. They declined to obey and proceedings were begun
in the courts for the purpose of enforcing this order. The
judge before whom the case came, while sustaining at a pre-
liminary stage of the proceedings the action of the Commis-
sion, suggested a doubt whether the relief sought was after
all of much consequence.
This terminal charge, applied to all the carloads of live-
stock entering Chicago during a single year, aggregates
about $500,000, and this amount is collected year after year.
The courts of that metropolis are continually called upon to
decide cases involving large sums of money, but seldom
have they, or will they, pass upon one of greater pecuniary
importance than is the question whether the imposition of
this trifling switching charge of two dollars per carload is
lawful.
Recently the Commission decided that grain rates from a
certain limited section of the State of Iowa were too high,
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and that they should be reduced from two to three cents per
hundred pounds. The first thought is, of what practical
value can this be to the grain producers of that section ?
Yet a moment’s consideration will make it plain that it is
in fact of great importance to the farmer. Without inquir-
ing what effect a general reduction in grain rates might
have upon the price of grain, it is evident that a reduction
from a circumscribed area must operate to raise the price by
exactly the amount of the reduction. Grain in this section
would be worth from one to two cents per bushel more with
the reduced rate in effect than it otherwise would. The
testimony in that case showed that the average yield of corn
was some thirty bushels per acre. The net money product
of every acre of corn land would therefore be increased by
this reduction in the rate from thirty to sixty cents, which
upon a six per cent basis means a difference of from five to
ten dollars per acre in the value of such land in that
vicinity.
These two examples, which might be indefinitely multi-
plied, sufficiently illustrate the fact that a change in rates,
which when applied to a single article or a single hundred
pounds would be insignificant, is when applied to the entire
volume of traffic which it concerns of the highest importance.
Along with this must be kept in mind another fact, which
is perhaps of even more fundamental consequence in the
examination of the particular question under discussion, and
that is the extremely narrow margin upon which business is
transacted at the present day. Some recent investigations
of the Commission have presented this in a most striking
light. Flour is to-day ground in this country upon a mar-
gin of two or three cents per hundred pounds, from four to
six cents a barrel. Coal in large quantities is handled from
the mine to the consumer at a profit of five or ten cents per ton.
One-half cent a bushel is a fair profit on grain. Such is the
sworn and undisputed testimony.
Let the meaning of this as applied to the freight rate be
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dearly apprehended. It means that if the grain dealer can
by any device secure an advantage over his competitor of
one-half cent a bushel, he thereby acquires the market as
against that competitor. If one miller can deliver his flour
at two cents per hundred pounds cheaper than the competing
miller, he grinds at a profit while his competitor does busi-
ness for nothing. A concession of ten cents per ton in the
freight rate on coal determines absolutely who shall and who
shall not handle the product of a particular mine or a par-
ticular locality. The same is true of other commodities.
A monopoly is by its derivation and in its simplest defini-
tion the giving to one in the sale of an article an advantage
which all do not possess. Let it be observed that in the
production and handling of the staple commodities about the
only point at which such advantage can be obtained is in
the agencies of transportation. Grain is an article of prime
necessity. Everybody can raise it; everybody can buy it;
everybody can grind it; everybody can sell it; but it must
.be transported from the railway station of the producer to
that of the consumer, often by one route, at most by few
routes, and the expense of this transportation is usually a
considerable part of its price to the consumer. So with
most of the prime necessities of life. Ordinarily the means
:and methods of competition must be open to all alike ; the
avenues of transportation are the exception. 
’
Consider next how preferences are or may be granted in
transportation. The obvious and simple way is by the giv-
ing of a special rate or by the payment of a rebate. Previous
to the enactment of the act to regulate commerce this was
the usual method. That act made the giving of a lower rate
to one shipper than was accorded others a crime. Both the
carrier who grants the special rate and the shipper who
receives it are liable to fine and sometimes imprisonment.
This necessarily worked a change in the method of granting
such preferences. First, the tendency is to seek some less
obvious method than the payment of a rebate under that
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name or the giving of the special rate as such. In this view
many devices have been adopted. These sometimes take the
form of an elevator commission; sometimes an excessive car
mileage; sometimes the shipper pays the full interstate rate
in consideration that he shall receive preferential rates
within the state to which the Interstate Commerce Act does
not apply.
Second, the effect is to reduce the number of persons
with whom these transactions are had to a minimum. The
fewer people who are engaged in the commission of these
crimes the less the risk of detection. The traffic manager
prefers to deal with one rather than many.
The central idea of the trust is the combination of large
amounts of capital in enormous transactions. It has money
with which to build elevators and cars. It has traffic in all
directions and under all conditions. It lacks apparently the
sense of right and wrong which might actuate its agents if
they were acting as individuals. Many trusts go further.
They demand concessions which the carrier dare not refuse
for fear of the punishment which may be inflicted by the
withdrawal of traffic. Not long ago a prominent railroad
president wrote to a friend who was a small packer: &dquo; I hope
the time will come when I can give you the same rate as
your great competitor, but to-day I cannot.&dquo;
Now, putting these four facts together, the great effect of
the small concession, the narrow margin on which business
is handled, the opportunity and inducement of the railway
to prefer one shipper to another, and the manner in which
that preference must be exercised, what should we naturally
expect ?
Should we not expect that the great shipper, and that
to-day is usually the trust, would enjoy these preferences at
the expense of the small shipper, and that this preference,
while small, a single cent as applied to a bushel of corn, twos
or three times that upon a hundred pounds of merchandise,
would give the market to the one receiving it ? These small
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sums often represent more than the entire margin upon
which the business is transacted, and are in the aggregate
millions of dollars annually. The unavoidable result must
be to exclude the small competitor from these operations and
to centre business in the hands of the large competitor.
And what is the fact ? It is well known that for years
past a large portion of the competitive railway traffic of this
country, especially those articles which are moved in large
quantities and in the handling of which a small amount in
the freight rate is of great consequence, have not been moved
upon the published rate. It is an equally well-known fact
that during the same time the tendency has been to centre
the handling of these articles in the hands of comparatively
few persons. The United States exports annually enormous
quantities of grain, but you can count upon your fingers the
concerns which bring the bulk of it to the American sea-
board. We are told that grain upon the Chicago market
is handled by a half dozen concerns. It is brought from
the fields west of Chicago into that city by as few. One
company buys upon one line of railway and nobody else
can buy there. Another upon another line. Exactly the
same thing is true of beef, pork, lard, provisions and almost
all those commodities which are the necessities of life.
Is there any connection between these facts ? Is the dis-
crimination in the freight rate responsible for the concen-
tration of business in the hands of the few ? There cannot
be the slightest doubt of it. No person at all familiar with
the situation has any other opinion. Freight rate discrimi-
nations are the most potent factor in the establishment and
continuance of great combinations of capital at the present
time. It may be doubted if a single one of those monop-
olies which have fastened themselves upon the country
in recent years could have done so in the face of absolute
equality in the freight rate. I do not now speak of this
epidemic of combination which has swept over the business
world in the last eighteen months, but of those so-called
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trusts in the essentials of life. Strip these great combina-
tions of all participation in and all dominion over the freight
rate and you take away from them the most important
advantage which they possess.
But how about the Standard Oil Company ? The repre-
sentatives of that combine stated under oath before the
Industrial Commission that since the enactment of the inter-
state commerce law of i 887 it had received no rebates and
accepted no special rates. Here then is this typical trust,
this, to the popular apprehension, arch-monopoly which
flourishes although it pays the open rate.
The representatives of the Standard Oil Company stated
that before 1887 it received rebates in common with other
shippers. The good fortune of that company in those days
was that its concessions far outran those of its rivals. It
is generally understood that the genesis of that institution
was railway favoritism. Its competitors assert that it derives
just as real assistance from the manipulation of freight rates
to-day as it ever has.
Departure from the published tariff is not by any means
the only method of railway preference. The most grievous
discriminations are often occasioned through the mal-
adjustment of the rates themselves. It is in this manner
that the Standard Oil Company is said to obtain its advan-
tage to-day.
For the purpose of illustration, take what is called New
Haven territory; that is, the territory controlled by the New
York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, embrac-
ing the southern part of New England. This territory upon
most commodities takes substantially the Boston rate. A
comparison of these rates in 1887 with present rates reveals
a peculiar fact.
In 1887 the rate from Cleveland to Boston on grain and
the products of grain was twenty-two cents, on iron articles
twenty-two cents, and on petroleum twenty-two cents. The
rate in October, 1899, was upon grain fifteen cents, upon
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iron articles twenty cents, and upon petroleum and its pro-
ducts twenty-four cents. While the freight rate generally
has declined, while the rate on probably every other article
of general consumption has declined, while the acual cost
of transportation has declined, we find that the rate upon
petroleum has advanced.
There is another peculiar fact. On most commodities
which are shipped from the West into New Haven territory
there exists a through rate. In the case of petroleum and
its products there is no such arrangement. Around New
Haven territory is found a Chinese wall beyond which no
carload of petroleum can penetrate unless it pays the local
rate over the New Haven road to its destination. Grain,
iron; coal-almost everything may be shipped from Cleve-
land into this territory under a joint tariff which in amount
is substantially the same as the Boston rate, while kerosene
must pay the Boston rate to the confines of that territory
and an added local rate beyond. Thus the rate on a carload
of corn from Cleveland to Boston was in October fifteen
cents per hundred pounds and to New Haven the same.
The rate on petroleum from Cleveland to Boston was twenty-
four cents and to New Haven thirty-six cents.
The significance of these two facts becomes apparent when
we consider how the petroleum business is handled in this
territory. The Standard Oil Company has extensive storing
facilities at East Boston and refines at seaboard points, or
transports at low cost the refined product to such points from
whence it is taken in tank boats to East Boston and thence
distributed. Independent refiners at Cleveland assert that
under present freight rates they cannot compete with the
Standard Oil Company in this territory; if they had the
former rate of twenty-two cents they might, if even the
present Boston rate were applied as a through rate into that
territory they might, but under existing adjustments they
are absolutely excluded.
Still another circumstance contributes to the same end.
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According to the tariffs of the New Haven Company petro-
leum and its products are second class unless the party to
whom it is consigned has a private siding or a tank opposite
the rails into which he can pump that petroleum from the
tank cars, in which case it is fifth class. Now, the Standard
Oil Company has these tauks and private sidings over all
this territory, while comparatively few are owned by inde-
pendent refiners. Persons without these facilities must pay
the second-class rate, while the Standard Oil Company pays
the fifth-class rate. The fifth-class rate between Boston and
New Haven is ten cents per hundred pounds; the second-
class rate twenty cents per hundred pounds, the difference
between the two probably representing several times the
profit in handling one hundred pounds of kerosene oil.
This is an illustration of one method by which the adjust-
ment of the freight rate helps the Standard Oil Company
against its competitors. For another and different way,
take the comparative rates on petroleum and its products
from Cleveland and Chicago to New Orleans and correspond-
ing territory. The distance is somewhat greater from Cleve-
land. Both these cities are competitors in the markets of
that territory. The demands of their merchants and of the
railways serving the two localities have established a general
relation in rates by which a difference of about two cents
per hundred pounds in low class freight is made in favor of
Chicago. Taking twenty-five articles of the most common
consumption which bear about the same rate with petroleum,
we find that in almost every instance the Cleveland rate is
two cents per hundred pounds higher than the Chicago rate.
Linseed oil, for instance, takes a rate of twenty-eight cents
from Cleveland and twenty-six cents from Chicago. When,
however, you reach petroleum, you find that while the rate
from Cleveland to New Orleans is thirty-one cents, the rate
from Chicago is twenty-three cents, a difference four times
as great as that in case of almost every other commodity
taking a corresponding rate. Now, there are large inde-
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pendent refiners at Cleveland. The Standard Oil Com-
pany has extensive refining works at Whiting, near Chicago,
which takes the Chicago rate, and there are no independent
refiners in that vicinity. The Cleveland refiners say that
this is an unjust discrimination against petroleum when
refined at Cleveland, the purpose and effect of which is
to deliver that southern territory over to the Standard Oil
monopoly.
Attention is not called to these facts for the purpose of
stirring up sentiment against trusts in general or the Stand-
ard Oil Company in particular. With much of this sort
which is said, I have no sympathy. The Standard Oil
Company, so far as I have observed in the department with
which I have to do, is no worse than other trusts, nor so bad
as many. These discriminations, if they are discrimina-
tions, to which I have called particular attention, are purely
business propositions. The New Haven road puts in these
tariffs because more revenue is yielded by them. Doubtless
the Cleveland lines are compensated in some other way for
the loss of traffic from there. The rates, such as they are,
are open.
What I desire is to emphasize the fact that such discrimi-
nations do exist; to fasten attention upon the importance
which they play in the upbuilding and maintaining of those
great aggregations of capital which are thought to threaten
the welfare of the body politic; to reiterate that they abso-
lutely shut out the small shipper. Before we adopt some of
the radical measures which have been suggested in dealing
with the trust, before we amend the Constitution of the
United States or enact laws which may impinge upon the
rights of property or trammel our commercial development,
this phase of the question should be looked to.
Just what ought to be done with the monopoly may be a
grave question, but that our railways, those arteries through
which the commercial life blood of this great nation flows,
should be open to great and small alike, admits of no
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doubt, and that they are not so open, admits of as little
doubt.
It may be asked why the Interstate Commerce Commission
does not prohibit these rate inequalities, thereby securing
equal treatment for all shippers. The answer is that it is
powerless to do so for reasons which have been often stated.
The cardinal purpose of the Act to regulate commerce is to
secure equal treatment for great and small, but without the
necessary amendments the beneficent provisions of that Act
are a nullity.
Washington, D. C.
CHARLES A. PROUTY.
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